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Abstract
Cognitive and social psychologists have uncovered a number of features of
ordinary thinking about risk. Giving particular attention to the work of Paul Slovic, this
review-essay explores how an understanding of human cognition bears on law and public
policy. The basic conclusion is that people make many mistakes in thinking about risk
and that sensible policies, and sensible law, will follow statistical evidence, not ordinary
people. The discussion explores the use of heuristics, the effects of cascades, the role of
emotions, demographic differences, the role of trust, and the possibility that ordinary
people have a special “rationality” distinct from that of experts. Because people are prone
to error, what matters, most of the time, is actual risk, not perceived risk.

In the late 1980s, the Environmental Protection Agency embarked on an
ambitious project, designed to compare the views of “the public” and “EPA
experts” on the seriousness of environmental problems.1 The project revealed
some striking anomalies, for the two groups sharply diverged on some crucial
issues.
With respect to health risks, the public’s top five concerns included
radioactive waste, radiation from nuclear accidents, industrial pollution of
waterways, and hazardous waste sites.2 But in the view of EPA experts, not one
of these problems deserved a “high” level of concern. Two of the public’s top
concerns (nuclear accident radiation and radioactive waste) were not even

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political
Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Daniel Kahneman, Martha Nussbaum, and
Richard A. Posner for very helpful comments on a previous draft.
1 Counting on Science At EPA, 249 Science 616 (1990).
2 Id.
*

ranked by EPA experts.3 Of health risks considered by the public, the very lowest
ranked were indoor air pollution and indoor radon—both ranked “high” by
experts. EPA concluded that there was a remarkable disparity between the views
of the public and the views of its own experts. It also noted, with evident
concern, that EPA policies and appropriations seemed to reflect the public’s
preoccupations, not its own. If law and policy reflect a combination of “hysteria
and neglect,” 4 the public’s own concerns may be largely responsible.5
With respect to risks, the persistent split between experts and ordinary
people raises some of the most interesting problems in all of social science. For
purposes of understanding these disputes, we might distinguish between two
approaches: the technocratic and the populist. Good technocrats tend to think that
ordinary people are frequently ill-informed and that the task of regulators is to
follow science, not popular opinion.6 On the technocratic view, the central
question is what the facts really show, and when people are mistaken on that
point, they should be educated so that they do not persist in their errors. Of
course technocrats acknowledge that science will often leave gaps and that the
proper course of action cannot be determined by science alone. But they urge
that facts are often the key issue, and that when they are, government should
follow the evidence, rather than public beliefs.
For their part, populists tend to distrust experts and to think that in a
democracy, government should follow the will of the citizenry rather than a selfappointed technocratic elite.7 On this view, what matters, for law and policy, is
Id.
See John Graham, Making Sense of Risk, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results
from Regulation 183, 183 (Robert Hahn ed. 1996).
5 Of course interest groups play a large role, both independently and in dampening and
heightening public concern.
6 This view is represented, in various ways, by Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle(1993);
Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk (1997).
7 This view is represented in Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993); Lisa
Heinzerling Political Science, U Chi L Rev (1995) (reviewing Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious
Circle (1995)). See also the remarks of Senator Joseph Biden in Justice Breyer’s confirmation
hearings: “The American people have no doubt that more people die from coal dust than from
nuclear reactions, but they fear the prospect of a nuclear reactor more than they do the empirical
data that would suggest that more people die from coal dust, having coal-fired burners. They
also know that more lives would be saved if we took that 25 percent we spend in the intensive
care units in the last few months of the elderly’s lives, more children would be saved. But part of
our culture is that we have concluded as a culture that we are going to rightly, or wrongly, we
are going to spend the money, costing more lives, on the elderly. . . . I think it’s incredibly
presumptuous and elitist for political scientists to conclude that the American people’s cultural
3
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what people actually fear, not what scientists, with their own, inevitably fallible
judgments, happen to think. For populists, ordinary intuitions have normative
force, and deserve to count in the democratic arena.
To make progress on the disagreement, it would be very valuable to have
a clearer sense of what, exactly, accounts for the split between experts and
ordinary people. Is one or another group biased? Are ordinary people
systematically ill-informed, and if so exactly why? Are intuitions likely to reflect
mistaken judgments of fact, or worthy judgments of value? Once we answer
these questions, there will remain normative problems, raising questions about
what should be done in the face of the relevant divisions. Perhaps what matters
is not whether people are right on the facts, but whether they are frightened.
Perhaps ordinary people have a kind of “thick” rationality, as worthy in its own
way as that of experts. Certainly experts can have their own biases and agendas.8
Perhaps the real issue is how to increase the public’s role in risk regulation, so
that government will respond to their concerns.
Of all those who have contributed to an understanding of the division
between experts and ordinary people, Paul Slovic has been the most systematic
and wide-ranging. Slovic has engaged in a series of empirical studies designed
to elicit people’s perception of risk—to see when they are frightened and when
they are not, and exactly why. Slovic’s own views defy easy categorization, but
he has strong populist leanings. In some of his most striking papers, Slovic urges
not that ordinary people are irrational or confused, but that as compared with
experts, they display a kind of “rival rationality” that is worthy of consideration
and respect.9 Insisting that “risk” is not simply a matter of numbers, Slovic urges
that a good system of risk regulation should be democratic as well as
technocratic –and that it should pay a great deal of attention to what he sees as
the structured and sometimes subtle thinking of ordinary people.10

values in fact are not ones that lend themselves to a cost-benefit analysis and presume that they
would change their cultural values if in fact they were aware of the cost-benefit analysis.”7
Confirmation Hearings for Stephen G. Breyer, to be an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (July 14, 1994) (Miller
Reporting transcript). I take up the relationship between Breyer’s views of risk and Slovic’s
findings in Part V below.
8 For a colorful popular treatment, see Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, Trust Us, We’re
Experts (2001).
9 See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Regulation of Risk: A Psychological Perspective, in Regulatory Policy
and the Social Sciences (Roger Noll ed. 1985).
10 See id.
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The essays in this illuminating and important book, written over a
number of years with many coauthors,11 cover a great deal of ground. Among
other things, Slovic deals with trust and distrust12; the “social amplification” of
risk13; risk-taking by adolescents14; smokers’ (lack of) awareness of the risks of
smoking15; the role of emotions in assessing, taking, and avoiding risks16;
differences across lines of race and gender17; the nature of “intuitive
toxicology”18; and much more. In this space it would be foolhardy to try to
examine all of these issues in detail. Instead I will focus on Slovic’s own unifying
theme: the different risk judgments of experts and ordinary people. I will also try
to connect Slovic’s claims to issues in policy and law, issues with which he deals
only briefly.
In my view, though not necessarily Slovic’s, the overriding message of
these essays is that because of predictable features of human cognition, ordinary
people deal poorly with the topic of risk. This lesson has major implications for
private and public law. . Slovic casts a new light on why the system of regulation
has taken its current form, showing some of the cognitive mechanisms that
produce “paranoia and neglect.” Some of his principal lessons involve how to
make law and policy work—including how to structure information campaigns,
which are unlikely to succeed unless their designers have a sense of how people
perceive risks. At the same time, I believe that Slovic establishes, with new
clarity, why sensible policymakers should generally follow science, not the
public. This point bears on the design of government institutions, as well as the
functioning of Congress, regulatory agencies, judges, and even juries
I will make two basic objections to this admirable book. The first is that
Slovic says too little about the social mechanisms by which individuals come to
think that a risk is serious or instead trivial. These mechanisms have multiple
connections with the cognitive points that Slovic emphasizes. Discussion with
others, for example, can make a risk both vivid or salient, and when individuals
see a risk as salient and vivid, they are likely to talk to others, thus increasing
I will refer to the author of the papers discussed here as “Slovic,” for ease of exposition, even
though in many cases, the paper in question has more than one author.
12 Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy at p. 316.
13 The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, at p. 220.
14 Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, at p. 364.
15 Id.
16 The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, id. at 413.
17 Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science, in id. at 390.
18 Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risks, in id. at 285.
11

4

both salience and vividness. The second is that some of Slovic’s own findings
seem to me to undermine his claim to have found a “rival rationality”—and that
whatever Slovic’s intentions, much of the importance of his work is to the strong
empirical support that it provides for a more technocratic view of regulation,
one that draws ordinary intuitions into grave doubt. As we shall see, both of
these objections have implications for law and for government institutions.
The review comes in several parts, separating Slovic’s claims into various
categories. In each part, I offer an outline of the relevant claims, evaluate them,
and discuss some of their implications for law. Part I deals with the idea of
heuristics, or mental shortcuts. My emphasis here in on the availability heuristic,
by which people think a risk is more serious if an example can be readily brought
to mind. I also deal with what Slovic calls “intuitive toxicology.” Part II discusses
Slovic’s “psychometric paradigm,” the basis for his effort to claim that ordinary
people have a kind of “rival rationality.” Part III explores the role of emotions
and in particular Slovic’s claim that the “affect heuristic” helps to explain
people’s reactions to risks. Part IV discusses some of Slovic’s fascinating findings
about demographic differences, knowledge of risks, and trust. Part V offers a
brief, general discussion of issues of policy and law.
I. Mental Shortcuts and Intuitive Toxicology
In several chapters, Slovic emphasizes that people use heuristics, or
mental shortcuts, to assess the presence and magnitude of risks. As Slovic makes
clear, he owes a large debt here to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who, in
a series of pathbreaking experiments, have uncovered several heuristics that
people use to assess probabilities.19 Consider, for example, the “availability
heuristic,” in accordance with which people assess the probability of an event by
seeing whether relevant examples are cognitively “available.”20 Thus, for
example, people are likely to think that more words, on a random page, end
with the letters “ing” than have “n” as their next to last letter21—even though a
moment’s reflection will show that this could not possibly be the case.
In the relevant experiments, Kahneman and Tversky were focussing on
cognition in general, and they did not deal with policy issues, or with people’s
See Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
eds. 1983), for an overview. For an illuminating discussion, see Daniel Kahneman and Shane
Frederick, Attribute Substitution (unpublished manuscript 2001, forthcoming).
20 See note 18 supra.
21 Id.
19
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evaluation of social risks. Slovic’s major contribution is to show the great
importance of the availability heuristic in helping to generate ordinary
judgments about risks to health, safety, and the environment. But Slovic also
shows a more general way that ordinary people go wrong. They rely on
“intuitive toxicology,” which contains a range of scientifically implausible
judgments, many of them apparently working as mental shortcuts. Moving
beyond individual cognition, Slovic also urges attention to the “social
amplification” of risk. In this Part, I outline Slovic’s findings and offer one
criticism, or perhaps friendly amendment: Slovic seems to me to have paid too
little attention to the social forces by which people come to fear, and not to fear,
certain hazards. I provide a brief discussion of how this gap might be filled.
A. The Availability Heuristic
In Slovic’s view, “[t]he notion of availability is potentially one of the most
important ideas for helping us understand the distortions likely to occur in our
perceptions of natural hazards” (p. 14). These distortions have concrete
consequences for behavior. For example, whether people will buy insurance for
natural disasters is greatly affected by recent experiences (p. 40). If floods have
not occurred in the immediate past, people who live on flood plains are far less
likely to purchase insurance (id.). In the aftermath of an earthquake, insurance
for earthquakes rises sharply—but it declines steadily from that point, as vivid
memories recede (id.).22
Note that the use of the availability heuristic, in these contexts, is hardly
irrational. Insurance can be expensive, and what has happened before seems,
much of the time, to be the best available guide to what will happen again.
Imperfectly informed people might do well to rely on the availability heuristic.
The problem is that the availability heuristic can lead to serious errors of fact.
Here as elsewhere, the use of a reasonable heuristic can produce decisions that
are wrong, from the standpoint of those who have an accurate of the actual
probabilities.
Do people know which risks led to many deaths, and which risks lead to
few? They do not. In fact they make huge blunders. In some especially striking
studies, Slovic demonstrates that the availability heuristic helps to explain
people’s mistakes in assessing the frequency of various causes of death. In one
study, people were told the annual number of deaths from motor vehicle
22

There is a link here with Slovic’s claims about the role of affect; see below.
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accidents in the United States (at the time about 50,000), and then asked to
estimate the number of deaths from forty other causes of death (pp. 106-09).23 In
another study, people were given two causes of death and asked to say which
produced more fatalities (p. 38). People tended to make large mistakes, and
when they did so, the availability heuristic was partly responsible. “In keeping
with availability considerations, overestimated items were dramatic and
sensational whereas underestimated items tended to be unspectacular events
which claim one victim at a time and are common in non-fatal form.” (p. 107).
Specifically, people significantly overestimated highly publicized causes of
death, including tornadoes, cancer, botulism, and homicide. By contrast, they
underestimated the number of deaths from stroke, asthma, emphysema, and
diabetes (id.). At the same time, people tend to think that the number of deaths
from accidents is higher than the number of deaths from disease, whereas the
opposite is true. In the same vein, people mistakenly believe that more people
die from homicides than from suicides. Availability can also “lull people into
complacency,” as when certain risks, not easily accessible, seem invisible, and
what is out of sight is “effectively out of mind” (p. 109).
These points suggest that highly publicized events are likely to lead
people to be exceedingly fearful of statistically small risks.24 Both law and policy
are likely to be adversely affected by people’s use of mental shortcuts. Public
officials, no less than ordinary people, are prone to use the availability heuristic.25
And in a democracy, officials, including lawmakers, will be reactive to public
alarm. If people are extremely concerned about the risk of airplane accidents, we
should expect aggressive regulation of airlines, perhaps to the point of
diminishing returns. If people are worried about abandoned hazardous waste
dumps, we might well expect a large amount of resources to be devoted to
cleaning them up, even if the risks are relatively small.26 Similar problems will
There is an important point here, not discussed by Slovic: People have little idea what number
is in the ballpark, and they need some kind of “anchor,” in the form of an annual death toll for
some familiar activity, in order to reduce, to a manageable degree, the “noise” in the data. For a
more recent study in the same vein, see W. Kip Viscusi. On the centrality of anchors when people
have a hard time generating “ballpark figures,” see Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and
David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages, Yale LJ (1998).
24 For a vivid demonstration in the context of catastrophes, see Jacob Gersen, Strategy and
Cognition: Regulatory Catastrophic Risk (unpublished manuscript 2001).
25 See Roger Noll and James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk
Regulation, 19 J Legal Stud 747, 749-60 (1990); Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan L Rev 683 (1999).
26 For evidence, see James Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi, Calculating Risks (1999); Timur Kuran
and Cass R. Sunstein, supra note.
23
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appear in courts, with juries and judges taking “phantom risks” quite seriously.27
There is also a lesson here about how to attract public attention to a risk: Make a
vivid example of its occurrence highly salient to the public. This way of proceeding, far
more than statistical analysis, is likely to activate public concern.
B. Intuitive Toxicology
Are ordinary people toxicologists? Slovic thinks so (p. 285). He uncovers
the content of “intuitive toxicology” by comparing how experts (professional
toxicologists) and ordinary people think about the risks associated with
chemicals. The result is a fascinating picture. It is not clear that any identifiable
heuristics are at work in intuitive toxicology. But it is clear that people are using
mental shortcuts, and that these lead to errors.
Slovic elicits the views of toxicologists and ordinary people on the
following kinds of propositions (p 291):
1. There is no safe level of exposure to a cancer-causing agent.
2. If you are exposed to a carcinogen, then you are likely to get cancer.
3. If a scientific study produces evidence that a chemical causes cancer in
animals, then we can be reasonably sure that the chemical will cause
cancer in humans.
4. The land, air and water around us are, in general, more contaminated
now than ever before.
5. Natural chemicals, as a rule, are not as harmful as man-made
chemicals.
6. Residents of a small community (30,000 people) observed that several
malformed children had been born there during each of the past few
years. The town is in a region where agricultural pesticides have been
in use during the last decade. It is very likely that these pesticides were
the cause of the malformations.
7. All use of prescription drugs must be risk-free.
Ordinary people agree with such statements, by pluralities or even
majorities (p. 291). By contrast, toxicologists disagree with such statements,
usually by overwhelming majorities (id.). What are ordinary people thinking?
See Phantom Risk, supra note, at 425–28 (discussing scientifically unsupportable outcomes
involving “traumatic cancer” and harm to immune systems); id. at 137-46 (discussing lawsuits
with unclear scientific basis).
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Can we discern some structure to their thinking? Three beliefs seem to be
playing a large role. First, many people appear to believe that risk is an “all or
nothing” matter. Something is either safe or dangerous, and there is no middle
ground.28 Second, many people seem committed to a belief in the benevolence of
nature. They think that the products of human beings, and human activities, are
more likely to be dangerous than the products of natural processes.29 Third,
many people tend to subscribe to the “zero risk” mentality, at least in some
domains. Many people believe that it is both possible and appropriate to abolish
risk entirely, a belief that appears closely connected with the notion that risk is a
matter of “all or nothing.”
Experts believe that all three beliefs are false. Moreover, it seems clear that
with respect to them, experts are thinking far more clearly than are ordinary
people. Why do people think this way? It might well be that at least some of
these ideas work well in most contexts in which nonspecialists find themselves.30
People want, for example, to know whether an activity is “safe,” not to know
about the statistical probability of harm; and the excessively simple category of
“safe” can tell them essentially what they need to know.31 The problem is that
ideas of this kind misfire in contexts in which regulatory choices, and some daily
decisions, have to be made. Nonspecialists may do well to rely on such
principles, but policymakers should do a good deal better.
Slovic also finds that experts do not entirely agree among themselves (p.
311; pp. 292–93). Most interestingly, toxicologists employed by industry are far
more optimistic about chemical risks than toxicologists employed by government
or academic institutions; there is a large “affiliation bias,” so that people tend to
believe what their institution would want them to believe (p. 311). I shall have
The point is connected with an aspect of prospect theory, described as the “certainty effect,” in
accordance with which “people overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to
outcomes that are merely probable.” See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:
An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in Choices, Values, and Frames 17, 20 (Daniel Kahneman ed.
2000).
29 For an interesting challenge from the perspective of ecology, see Botkin, Adjusting Law to
Nature’s Discordant Harmonies, 7 Duke Env. Law & Policy Forum 25 (1996).
30 This is a standard defense of most heuristics. See Tversky and Kahneman, supra note; Gerd
Gigerenzer, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (1999).
31 It cannot, however, be said that a belief in the benevolence of nature is a sensible heuristic. In
fact, this is a dangerous idea, because the unnatural is often safer than the natural. See Alan
McHughen, Pandora’s Picnic Basket (2000). On ecology, see Botkin, supra note. The belief in the
benevolence of nature might well be a holdover from certain theological views. See Janet
Radcliffe Richards, Human Nature After Darwin (2001).
28
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more to say about that particular bias below. But the differences among
toxicologists are dwarfed by the differences between toxicologists and ordinary
people. We should conclude that one’s social role will move one’s judgment in
predictable directions, and that experts are likely to be biased if they are working
with someone having a stake in the outcome—but also that even acknowledging
this point, experts are, on many fundamental issues, to be in basic accord with
one another.
C. Social Amplification
As Slovic is aware, mental shortcuts do not operate in a social vacuum,
and interpersonal influences can play a large role. With respect to risks, most of
us, most of the time, lack independent knowledge, and we must therefore rely on
the beliefs of others.
Slovic’s principal treatment of this point comes in a discussion of what he
calls the “social amplification of risk” (p. 232). Strikingly, the major point of this
discussion is not to explain how social influences affect people’s perception of
risks, but instead to show what might be missed by conventional efforts to
tabulate the costs and benefits associated with risks. For example, the 1979
accident at Three Mile Island “demonstrated dramatically that factors other than
death, injury, and property damage can impose serious costs and social
repercussions” (p. 234). Even though no one was killed or even harmed by the
accident, the result was to impose “enormous costs”—in the form of stricter
regulations, reduced operation of reactors worldwide, greater public opposition
to nuclear power, and a less viable role for one of the major long-term energy
sources—on the entire nuclear industry and on society as a whole” (pp. 234–35).
Slovic is concerned that a conventional risk analysis, focussed on the likelihood
and probability of harm, will overlook these kinds of consequences. He adds that
in some domains, society provides not amplification, but a kind of “social
attenuation of risk” (p. 235), producing underestimation of and underresponse to
potentially serious harms. As examples, he offers the cases of indoor radon,
smoking, and driving without a seat belt (p. 235).
In dealing with the social amplification of risks, then, Slovic is especially
concerned about the “secondary impacts” of dangers usually viewed in narrower
terms. When a problem emerges, there might be a sharp overall decline in social
trust; liability and insurance costs might increase; people might impose pressure
for new regulations; social disorder is quite possible (p. 239). Because dramatic
events are an important determinant of individual risk judgments, a highly
10

publicized incident might well move people in the direction of fear that is quite
unwarranted by reality. The flow of information, especially via the media, can be
extremely important here, not only in spreading facts but also in shaping
perceptions. This is Slovic’s effort to cast light on the processes by which
“seemingly minor risks or risk events often produce extraordinary public
concern and social and economic impacts, with rippling effects across time, space
and social institutions” (245).
D. Social Amplification: The Search for Mechanisms
By emphasizing that social amplification of risks, Slovic seems to me to be
pointing in a helpful direction, one that provides a valuable supplement to his
general focus on individual cognition. But his discussion suffers from being too
much of a collection of factors, one that does not give a clear sense of the
mechanisms by which “social amplification” occurs. Here, then, is a criticism, or
at least extension, of Slovic’s treatment of mental shortcuts, intuitive toxicology,
and social forces. There is much to be said about the social origins of individual
beliefs, emphasizing that people contribute to the creation and intensity of the
same forces by which they are influenced. My aim here is to fill a gap in Slovic’s
presentation by offering a sketch of the relevant influences.
1. Informational influences. A good way to begin is by drawing on
emerging work on the nature of social cascades, 32 and by sketching an
understanding of “risk perception cascades” in particular. The starting point, and
what makes cascades possible, is a simple recognition that in many domains,
people lack much in the way of first-hand information. Certainly this is the case
for many hazards. Because few people know, for a fact, about the dangers of
arsenic in water, or global warming, or Lyme Disease, or asbestos in the
workplace, they must rely on the signals given by other people.
To see how risk perception cascades work, consider a stylized example.
John is unsure whether global warming is a serious problem, but Sarah, whom
John trusts, believes that it is. Giving consideration to Sarah’s views, John
decides that global warming is indeed a serious problem. Frank would be
inclined, on his own, to discount the risk; but confronted with the views of Sarah
See, e.g., Sushil Biikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others, J. Econ. Persp.,
Summer 1998, at 151; Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory,
87 Am. Econ. Rev. 847 (1997); Abhijit Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. Econ.
797 (1992); Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment, 1 Am. L. & Ec.
Rev. 158, 159-65 (1999).
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and John, Frank might well come to believe that global warming is indeed a
serious problem. Pauline, a skeptic about global warming, would have to have a
great deal of confidence to reject the shared beliefs of Frank, Sarah, John, and
Frank. Before long, the members of this little community will come to share a
belief that global warming is a matter of considerable concern.33
Stylized though it is, this description seems to capture the dynamics of
many social movements with respect to risk,34 captured in the notion of an
informational cascade.35 The spreading belief in Lyme disease appears to be a case
in point, with many people believing that they have the disease, and many
doctors confirming the diagnosis, simply because they have heard from others of
connection between Lyme disease and certain symptoms.36 Because of the
availability heuristic, the cascade can be greatly fueled, or accelerated, if a salient
event is easily brought to mind.37
2. Reputational influences. Of course informational forces are not all that is
at work; reputation matters too. Because most people care about the views of
others, it is easy to imagine reputational cascades with respect to actions or stated
beliefs.38 Suppose, for example, that Allan and Betty would think ill of anyone
who argues that the global warming is not a problem. Carl, who is not sure what
to think about global warming, might be unmoved privately by the views of
Allan and Betty, and might even consider them fanatical; but he might
nonetheless not want to incur the wrath of Allan and Betty, or to seem ignorant,
or to appear indifferent to the welfare of future generations. If so, Carl might
show no opposition to dramatic steps to halt global warming , or might even
agree publicly with Allan and Betty that such steps are necessary. If Deborah is
otherwise in equipoise, she might be most reluctant to oppose Allan, Betty, and
Carl publicly. Mounting reputational pressures might well lead Ellen, Frank,
George, and Helen, and many more, to join the bandwagon. The eventual result

See Biikhchandani et al, supra note; David Hirschleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind, in The
New Economics of Human Behavior (1998).
34 For many examples, see Penina Glazer and Myron Glazer, The Environmental Crusaders
(1998).
35 See sources cited in note 33 supra.
36 See Stalking Dr. Steele, The New York Times Magazine, July 17, 2001, at 52. On informational
cascades among experts, see Hirschleifer, supra note.
37 See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, supra note.
38 See Kuran, supra note.
33
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would be to affect law and policy, as citizens seem support massive social
efforts.39
I believe that with respect to risk, informational influences are the most
important, as individual fear grows with a sense that other (reasonable) people
are frightened; but reputational influences are also pertinent. If the example just
given seems artificial, consider the suggestion of a medical researcher who
questions a number of Lyme disease diagnoses: “Doctors can’t say what they
think anymore. . . . If you quote me as saying these things, I’m as good as
dead.”40 Or consider the remarks of a sociologist who has publicly raised
questions about the health threats posed by mad-cow disease, suggesting that if
you raise those doubts publicly, “You get made to feel like a pedophile.”41
In the context of regulation of hazardous waste dumps, it is clear that
reputational factors actually helped to fuel a cascade effect, eventually leading to
the Superfund statute.42 Lawmakers, even more than ordinary citizens, are
vulnerable to reputational pressures; in fact that is part of their job. Hence they
might support legislation to control risks that they know to be quite low. Nor is
the only problem one of excessive legal controls. In a phenomenon similar to
Slovic’s “social attenuation of risks,” we can imagine “unavailability cascades,”
in which people’s relative indifference to statistically significant risks leads other
people to be indifferent too.43 Undoubtedly informational and reputational forces
of this kind help account for public indifference to many hazards that trouble
experts. Thus perceptions of risk are often a product of those forces.
Note that these points are complementary to Slovic’s emphasis on the
availability heuristic and intuitive toxicology. What is “available” will be a
function of informational and reputational forces: If people are talking about the
risks associated with pesticides, or disposal diapers, those risks will be available
in the public mind. And if people are spreading the idea that arsenic “causes
cancer,” and should therefore be banned, the premises of intuitive toxicology
will spread as if by contagion.

See id.
Stalking Dr. Steele, supra, at 56.
41 Wall Street Journal.
42 See Kuran and Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, supra note.
43 See id.
39
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3. Group polarization. A related phenomenon, that of group polarization,44
helps to strengthen these forces. It is well established that when a group of
people engages in deliberation, group members will tend to move toward a more
extreme position in line with their predeliberation inclinations. This is the typical
pattern among deliberating bodies. Thus, for example, a group of people who
fear the effects of second-hand smoke, or who believe that pesticides carry
significant risks, is likely, after discussion, to believe that the health dangers here
are extremely serious. So too, a group of people who tend to think that the risks
of global warming have been exaggerated will tend to think, after discussion,
that global warming is no cause for concern. In fact there is no reason to think
that experts are immune to group polarization; they are certainly vulnerable to
cascade effects.45 Massive evidence, from many different countries, supports the
basic prediction.46 If like-minded people are talking, much of the time, with one
another, it is especially likely that large groups of people will show heightened
concern about certain risks, whatever the evidence suggests—and also that large
groups of people will show no concern at all, even if the evidence gives cause for
alarm. There can be no doubt that group polarization has contributed to social
divisions with respect to risk regulation; indeed, Slovic’s demonstrated
“affiliation bias” probably has a great deal to do with group polarization. And
when society generally shows alarm, or indifference, group polarization is likely
to be part of the reason.

See Roger Brown, Social Psychology (2d ed. 1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble: Why
Groups Go To Extremes, 110 Yale LJ (2000).
45 See Hirschleifer, supra note.
46 Why does group polarization occur? Though no cascade need be involved, the two principal
explanations are close to the explanations for informational and reputational cascades. See
Brown, supra note, which I summarize here. The first involves informational influences. In a
deliberating group with an initial tendency in favor of X and against Y, there will be a
disproportionate number of arguments in favor of X, simply because most people will speak out
on behalf of X. Group members will have thought of some, but not all, of the arguments in that
direction. After deliberating, the arguments for X will seem stronger, to individual members, and
the arguments for Y will seem even weaker. Hence it is to be expected that discussion will move
people to a more extreme form of their original enthusiasm for X. The second explanation points
to social influences. Most people care about their reputations and their self-conception. Suppose,
for example, that you are inclined to think that nuclear power is not dangerous, but you are not
entirely sure; suppose too that you find yourself in a group which also rejects the idea that
nuclear power is dangerous. If you think of yourself as the sort of person who is, more than most,
inclined to support nuclear power, you might move a bit, if only to maintain your reputation
within the group and your self-conception on the issue at hand. The evidence strongly supports
the proposition that this happens.
44
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In sum: Slovic has performed a valuable service in showing how the
availability heuristic and intuitive toxicology help to produce inaccurate
judgments about risk. As compared with ordinary people, experts are able to
reach accurate judgments, if only because they have access to more information,
making the easily-recalled incident a less important determinant of judgment
and producing more accuracy than can come from the simple ideas on which
ordinary people rely.47 Slovic is also right to emphasize that social forces can
amplify the effect of the heuristic. The principal gap in his discussion lies in his
treatment of those forces. There is much more to be done here, both at the level of
theory and at the level of empirical detail. In addition, Slovic’s psychological
claims offer some clues to the development of federal regulatory policy—
showing, for example, how the vivid example can play such a significant role in
producing new legislation or new rules at the agency level. Sometimes the use of
such examples will be valuable, because it will activate social concern about
previously neglected problems; but sometimes it will lead to perverse results, in
the form of massive expenditures on small problems, or even nonproblems.48
Here too much remains to be done.
II. The Psychometric Paradigm: Are Experts Irrational?
Thus far the discussion has involved the vulnerability of ordinary people
to mistaken beliefs about risks. But Slovic also insists that in many ways,
ordinary people are not mistaken at all. Their judgments about risks involve
evaluative judgments that are worthy of respect. For Slovic, experts seem, much
of the time, to be obtuse. This is one of the most striking claims in Slovic’s book;
it deserves careful attention, in part because the federal government is now
taking Slovic’s arguments directly into account.49
A. Rival Rationality? The Basic Claim
The idea that ordinary people are making subtle judgments of value is
embodied in what Slovic calls the “psychometric paradigm” (p. 222) According
to the psychometric paradigm, ordinary people certainly care, as experts do,
For a detailed treatment, see Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk (1997).
See Noll and Krier, supra note (arguing for “striking when the iron is cold”); Phantom Risk,
supra note.
49 See the “sensitivity analysis” for arsenic regulation, which includes a 7% increase in monetized
risk for the involuntary nature of the exposure and also for its uncontrollability. See Fed. Reg.
(2000). See also Environmental Protection Agency, Benefit-Cost Analysis (2000) (discussing these
factors).
47
48
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about the number of lives at risk as a result of some product of activity. But there
is also a significant difference between the two camps. Experts tend to focus on
one variable: the number of lives at stake. But ordinary people have a less crude and
more complex approach (p. 223). They care about a range of qualitative variables
that can lead to materially different evaluations of statistically identical risks.
Thus Slovic uncovers a long list of “factors” that can make risks more or
less acceptable, holding expected fatalities constant. These include whether the
risk is (1) dreaded; (2) potentially catastrophic; (3) inequitably distributed; (4)
involuntary; (5) uncontrollable; (6) new; and (7) faced by future generations (p.
140). Because these factors are so crucial, “riskiness means more to people than
‘expected number of fatalities’” (p. 231). And because they focus on such factors,
Slovic thinks that in an important respect, ordinary people think better, and more
rationally, than experts do. According to Slovic, people’s “basic conceptualization of risk is much richer than that of experts and reflects legitimate concerns
that are typically omitted from expert risk assessments” (p. 231). This is the basis
for Slovic’s claim that experts and ordinary people display “rival rationalities”
and that “each side must respect the insights and intelligence of the other” (id.).
This is a striking and provocative claim. It has also been highly
influential.50 And in some ways, it is clearly correct. The risks associated with
voluntary activities (skiing, horseback riding) receive less public concern than
statistically smaller risks from involuntary activities (food preservatives,
pesticides, herbicides, certain forms of air pollution). People do seem to be
willing to pay more to prevent a cancer death than to prevent a sudden
unanticipated death,51 and one reason is that cancer is especially “dreaded.”52 In
pointing to the importance of qualitative factors, Slovic has made a significant
advance, one that deserves to be incorporated into regulatory policy, as indeed it
appears to be doing.53 We can go further. If Slovic is right, the populist view has
received strong empirical support, and the technocratic position has taken a
serious blow. The reason is that technocrats miss important values to which
ordinary people rightly call attention. Indeed, if Slovic is right, regulatory policy

See id.
See George Tolley et al., Valuing Health for Policy (1995).
52 See Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of
Human Lives, 99 Col L Rev 941 (1999).
53 See the EPA’s use of involuntariness and uncontrollability as part of its sensitivity analysis in
valuing arsenic reductions, Fed. Reg. (2001).
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should be rethought in quite fundamental ways, with government incorporating
the relevant values far more thoroughly than it has yet done.54
I do not believe, however, that Slovic’s evidence establishes as much he
thinks he does, and some of the central ideas here—dread, voluntariness,
control—seem to me underanalyzed. I also suspect that Slovic has missed an
important part of the picture; and an understanding of what he has overlooked
reinforces the view that when experts and ordinary people differ, experts are
right and ordinary people are wrong.
B. Rival Rationality? Data, Questions, and Doubts
Evidence first. How do we know that ordinary people think that these
qualitative factors are so important? The answer is not that people spontaneously
point to such factors in explaining their assessments of risk. We do not have data
to suggest that ordinary people have an accurate sense of the number of lives at
stake, and that their judgments stem from qualitative judgments.55 Instead the
answer is that Slovic and his fellow experimenters expressly identify these
factors and set them before experimental subjects (p. 222, pp. 203–6). Slovic and
his collaborators ask people to rate certain risks along these specific dimensions
(id.). On a seven-point scale, people are asked to rate various risks in terms of
their catastrophic potential, their dreadedness, their threat to future generations,
their controllability, and so forth (id.). Is it at all surprising, or even informative,
that the risks that people most fear tend to be rated most severely along these
dimensions?
Slovic finds that the most feared risks include DDT, pesticides, herbicides,
and smoking (p. 143), whereas X-rays, microwave ovens, non-nuclear electric
power, marijuana, and sunbathing (pp 144–45) are ranked far lower. He also
finds that the most feared risks do worse, along several of the “qualitative”
dimensions, than those risks that are least feared. But this finding does not
establish that the qualitative dimensions are the grounds for people’s rankings of
these risks. Nothing in the data is inconsistent with the possibility that people
fear certain risks because they think that they are statistically large; that this is
the judgment that best explains their rankings; but that people’s rankings of
statistically large risks will, on the qualitative dimensions, suggest more
See id., which is simply a start toward a more thorough-going effort, some of whose
implications are traced in Revesz, supra note.
55 In Slovic finds that people do not know the actual numbers. See supra.
54
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concern than their judgments, on those same dimensions, of statistically small
risks. On this view, the rankings on the qualitative dimensions are explained by,
and do not themselves explain, people’s concern about the large statistical risks
associated with certain products and practices. Slovic is undoubtedly right to say
that the qualitative factors matter. But his evidence seems to me too crude to
disprove a competing hypothesis, to the effect that people’s rankings of risks
reflect, in significant part, inaccurate statistical assessments, and are not mostly
driven by a “richer rationality.”56
If we look closely at Slovic’s actual list of hazards, it is not clear how to
explain the results in terms of qualitative factors. Of ninety hazards, smoking is
ranked ninth, while marijuana is ranked 85th (pp. 143–45); what “qualitative
factors” on Slovic’s list could account for this dramatic difference? Are the risks
of smoking less voluntary and more inequitably distributed? What is the richer
rationality that produces these judgments? One hypothesis is that people know
that the risks from smoking are quite large, but believe that the risks from
marijuana are quite low, and that this is the reason for the otherwise inexplicably
different rankings. Or consider the fact (id.) that pesticides and herbicides rank
seventh and eighth on the list, while X-rays rank 30th, food preservatives 35th,
and food irradiation 39th. Can this pattern of judgments really be explained in
terms of voluntariness, equity, potentially catastrophic quality, and risk to future
generations? This does not seem plausible. It is far from clear what accounts for
this pattern of judgments. But the idea that people are showing a “richer
rationality” has not been demonstrated.57

Consider the possibility, pressed by Margolis, supra note, that these factors operate as ex post
justifications for decisions reached on other grounds. It is well established that people are not
especially good at offering the actual grounds for their judgments, and that sometimes they will
offer accounts that demonstrably diverge from reality. In an especially interesting experiment,
people were asked to choose one item of clothing from a pair. Actually the two items were
identical, and people generally picked the item on the left side, apparently for no other reason
than that it was on the left side. But asked for the basis for their decisions, people offered
elaborate accounts, citing superior texture and color. See id. In this light there is reason to be
cautious about the suggestion that these qualitative factors are the actual basis for people’s
judgments about risks. In fact things are still worse for Slovic’s causal hypothesis, because (as I
have noted) the qualitative factors said to support ordinary risk perceptions are not generated by
people on their own, but are suggested by experimenters.
57 One possibility, stressed by Slovic himself (p. 413) and taken up in detail below, is that the
“affect heuristic” underlies people’s judgments. See below.
56
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C. Elaborating a Competing Hypothesis
It is possible to explain people’s perceptions in multiple different ways.
Slovic’s own discussion of the availability heuristic offers the beginning of one
such competing account: When a relevant incident readily comes to mind, people
are much more likely to be fearful than when it does not. The risks associated
with nuclear power, smoking, and pesticides receive a great deal of publicity;
little attention is given to the risks associated with x-rays, food preservatives, and
food irradiation. If this point is right, people are concerned largely with the
number of lives at risk. They simply err on that key question. The various
qualitative considerations are not, on this view, irrelevant; but they place much
less of a role than Slovic suggests in explaining the split between experts and
ordinary people.
It is even possible that some of people’s judgments are attributable to
rough-and-ready assessments of whether the activities in question are beneficial
or harmful on balance—and that these assessments drive evaluations in varying
directions.58 Consider, for example, Howard Margolis’ powerful and detailed
criticisms of the psychometric paradigm,59 a criticism with which Slovic does not
engage. Margolis thinks that the psychometric paradigm does not explain
lay/expert divisions, and he suggests a quite different analysis of those divisions.
Margolis’ bottom-line: Experts know the facts and ordinary people do not. While
Slovic attempts to vindicate the richer thinking of lay people, Margolis leans
heavily in the technocratic direction, challenging the populist underpinnings of
those who celebrate the ‘rival rationality” of ordinary people.
Margolis’ basic account is exceedingly simple.60 He thinks that in some
cases, ordinary people are alert to the hazards of some activity, but not much
alert to its benefits, which are cognitively “off-screen.” In such cases, people will
tend to think, “better safe than sorry,” and they will have a highly negative
reaction to the risk. In such cases, they will demand aggressive and immediate
regulation. In other cases, the benefits of the activity will be very much on
people’s minds, but not the hazards—in which case they will tend to think,
“nothing ventured, nothing gained.” In such cases, they will think that regulators
. Of course this point is not meant to deny the fact that a potentially catastrophic risk is likely to
attract more attention than its discounted value warrants. Note on prospect theory. High levels of
risk aversion with respect to low-probability, disastrous outcomes. Connect to prospect theory in
general, not discussed by Slovic, an unfortunate omission.
59 See Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk (1998).
60 Id. at 75-92.
58
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are overzealous, even fanatics. In still other cases—in Margolis’ view, the cases in
which observers are being most sensible—both benefits and risks will be “on
screen,” and people will assess risks by comparing the benefits with the costs.
It is reasonable to think that for experts, benefits and costs are usually onscreen, and that when ordinary people are much more alarmed than experts, it is
sometimes because the risks are apparent but benefits are not. How else are we
to make sense of the fact that the very small risks associated with X-rays do not
occasion much concern, while the very small risks associated with pesticides and
herbicides frequently appear on the list of most feared risks? A sensible
conjecture is that people know that on balance, a world with x-rays is safer, and
better, than a world without them. For pesticides and herbicides, by contrast, the
benefits seem far less tangible and vague, if they are visible at all. It is safe to
predict that if people were told, by a reliable source, that eliminating pesticides
would lead to serious health problems—for example, because pesticide-free
fruits and vegetables carried special dangers—the perceived risk of pesticides
would decline dramatically. Indeed I predict that if people were informed that
eliminating pesticides would lead to a significant cost in the price of applies and
oranges, the perceived risk would go down as well.
Margolis offers a nice example to support this prediction. The removal of
asbestos from schools in New York was initially quite popular, indeed
demanded by parents, even though experts believed that the risks were
statistically small. But when it emerged that the removal would cause schools to
be closed for a period of weeks, and when the closing caused parents to become
greatly inconvenienced, parental attitudes turned right around, and asbestos
removal seemed like a bad idea. When the costs of the removal came on-screen,
parents thought much more like experts, and the risks of asbestos seemed like
the risks of X-rays: Statistically small, and on balance worth incurring.
A reasonable conjecture, then, is that when ordinary people diverge from
experts, it is because ordinary people see the risks but not the benefits, whereas
experts see both. Some evidence for this conjecture comes from some of Slovic’s
most interesting data. Slovic finds that when people think that a product has a
high risk, they tend to think that it has low benefits (pp. 415–17)—and that when
they think that a product has a high benefit, they tend to think that it carries a
low risk too (id.). It is unusual for people to think that a product with a high risk
also has a high benefit. This finding strongly suggests that when ordinary people
are more fearful than experts, it is often because ordinary people are not looking
at the benefits that accompany the product at issue. It also suggests that when
20

ordinary people are less fearful than experts—as was the case, for many years,
for cigarettes—it is because ordinary people are not looking at the risks, but
instead only at the benefit side. In sum: Slovic’s findings might be explained not
only or mostly by reference to rival rationality, but also and more fundamentally
to some combination of the availability heuristic and a failure, on the part of
ordinary people, to put all of the effects of risks “on screen.”
D. No Dichotomies Here
There is a further problem. Many of the qualitative factors that are said to
lead people to a “rich” conception of risk need a good deal of unpacking. Slovic
seems to take the qualitative variables as marking dichotomies, or at least clear
distinctions. But they raise many questions.
1. The example of dread. Some risks are said to be “dread,” whereas other
risks are not. But what does this mean? In the abstract, to say that a risk is
“dread” seems to be to say that people fear it—which suggests that the idea of
dread is just a synonym for perception of risk, not an explanation for it. If so, it is
no surprise that there is a correlation between risks perceived as serious and
risks deemed to be dread. (Is it surprising that people are scared of things that
they find frightening?) It is even possible that when people say that a risk is
“dread,” what they mean, in part, is that the risk is large in magnitude. People do
not “dread” being attacked by unicorns or Martians. But they do dread cancer,
partly because the risk of getting cancer is not so low.
Slovic himself uses the term “common” as an antonym to “dread” (p. 94),
but that raises further problems. Cancer is a common risk. But it is also the
prototype of a dread risk. In trying to explain how the qualitative factors of
dread explains the divergence between experts and ordinary people, we seem to
be reaching a dead end.
If progress is to be made here, perhaps we can assume that a dread risk is
one that is accompanied by significant pain and suffering before death.61 This is
certainly an intelligible idea. Perhaps people are especially fearful of fatality
risks that involve, not especially high probabilities of death, but deaths that are
unusually difficult or gruesome. This speculation is supported by data
suggesting that people are willing to pay significantly more to avert deaths from
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I try to defend this view in Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, J. Risk and Uncertainty (1998).
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cancer than deaths from heart disease.62 But if dread is understood in this way, a
great deal of work would be necessary to establish that this is what people are
really thinking; and Slovic’s data do not specifically confirm the point.
2. Voluntariness and controllability. Now turn to the ideas of voluntariness
and controllability.63 At first glance, the risks associated with pesticides and
herbicides might seem involuntary and uncontrollable, whereas the risks from
smoking and driving might seem voluntary and controllable. People choose to
smoke and to drive. At least this is what people seem to say, when asks to rank
risks along the relevant dimensions on seven-point scales.
On reflection, however, these issues are complicated. It is not especially
difficult to avoid pesticides. Many people can and do select pesticide-free food.
The decision to smoke seems voluntary, but smoking is addictive, and many
people seek to quit but find, or say, that they cannot. The decision to drive might
seem voluntary, but in many places, it is hard, or expensive, to get to work
without a car. Perhaps the risks associated with driving are controllable, but
many accidents are not the fault of one of the drivers involved. Are the risks
from ambient air pollution involuntarily incurred? It might seem that they are,
but people have a choice of where to live, and some areas have much cleaner air
than others. Are the risks from flying uncontrollable? Many people seem to think
so. But no one is under a legal obligation to fly. Why are the risks of flying so
much less controllable than the risks from bicycles or microwave ovens (p. 142)?
In this light, it is probably best not to see a dichotomy between
voluntariness and involuntariness, but to start by asking about two issues: (a)
whether those who are subject to a risk are informed of its existence and (b)
whether it is costly, or burdensome, to avoid the risk in question. When a risk
seems “involuntary,” it is usually because people who face the risk do not know
about it, or because it is especially difficult, or costly, to avoid it. When a risk
seems “voluntary,” it is usually because those who run the risk are fully aware of
it, and because risk avoidance seems easy or cheap. And if we think of things in
these terms, there is no sharp dichotomy between “controllable”
and
“uncontrollable” risks, or even between “voluntary” and “involuntary” risks.

See Revesz, supra note, at; Tolley et al., supra note, at.
These are the two factors emphasized by the EPA in its sensitivity analysis involving arsenic.
See note supra.
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Indeed these terms seem far too crude to capture what is really important.64 To
the extent that ordinary people rely on them, they might be gesturing toward a
sensible way of thinking about risks. But it is too much to claim that they have a
“rival rationality.”
E. A Mixed Verdict
I have been claiming, not that Slovic is wrong to say that qualitative
factors matter to ordinary perceptions of risk, but that he claims more than the
evidence establishes, and that the same evidence said to support “rival
rationality” might reflect simple errors of fact. An interesting way to test my
claims would be to see whether people are able to generate statistically accurate
judgments about certain risks. When specifically asked about the number of
expected deaths from various sources, do people make roughly the same
judgments that experts do? If so, then it might indeed be that when ordinary
people diverge from experts, it is because of the qualitative factors to which
Slovic points.65 But if ordinary people err in estimating the number of lives at
risk, and if their perceptions of risk severity are correlated with their estimates,
then their errors might well explain the divergences.
Actually Slovic does provide some evidence on this point (pp. 105–07),
and I believe that it undermines his claim. On the purely factual issues, he finds
systematic mistakes by ordinary people (id.), and these mistakes must have some
connection to their disagreements with experts. Other evidence supports Slovic’s
findings here.66 Slovic has not sorted out the extent to which these errors, or
instead qualitative judgments, underlie the relevant disagreements. There
remains a large empirical agenda here.
Where does this leave us? It suggests that many of the disagreements
between experts and ordinary people stem from the fact that experts have more
information, and are also prepared to look at the benefits as well as the risks
associated with controversial products and activities. To the extent that experts
focus only on the number of lives at stake, they are genuinely obtuse. It is
In this way they have much in common with intuitive toxicology, which also sees things in “all
or nothing” terms. Is it unfair to say that the use of such dichotomies reflects a form of intuitive
psychometrics?
65 The “might well” is necessary. It might be that when people are assessing risks, they are not
much thinking about the number of lives at stake, and that when they are forced to think about
the important matter, their assessments change. Cf. Kahneman on dates.
66 Viscusi.
64
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reasonable to devote special attention to dangers that are hard to avoid, or
accompanied by special suffering, or faced principally by children. But there is
no “rival rationality” in taking these factors into account. On the positive side,
what is needed is more empirical work to determine the extent to which ordinary
risk perceptions are based on errors or instead on values. On the normative side,
what is needed to more thought about the nature of concepts like “dread,”
“involuntary,” and “uncontrollable.” With respect to policy, what is needed is
incorporation of people’s values, to the extent that they can survive a process of
reflection.
III. Emotions and Trust
Thus far the discussion has focussed on individual and social cognition. As
Slovic emphasizes, most psychological work on risk has been highly cognitive in
orientation, asking whether mental heuristics produce errors, and how people
generally depart from what is generally considered to be rational behavior. But
there seems to be a gap in thinking about perceived risks only in these terms.
With respect to risks, many of our ordinary ways of speaking suggest strong
emotions: panic, hysteria, terror.67 Slovic also wants to explore some central
question: How do people’s feelings affect their reactions to risks?
Slovic’s interest in this topic appears to have been triggered by a
remarkable finding, mentioned above: When asked to assess the risks and
benefits associated with certain items, people tend to think that risky activities
contain low benefits, and that beneficial activities contain high risks (pp. 415–16).
In other words, people are likely to think that activities that seem dangerous do
not carry benefits; it is rare that they will see an activity as both highly beneficial
and quite dangerous, or as both benefit-free and danger-free. This is extremely
odd. Why don’t people think, more of the time, that some activity is both highly
beneficial and highly risky? Why do they seem to make a kind of general, gestalttype judgment, one that drives assessment of both risks and benefits? Aware that
risk and benefit are “distinct concepts,” Slovic thinks that “affect” comes first,
and helps to “direct” judgments of both risk and benefit. Hence it suggests an
“affect heuristic,” by which people have an emotional, all-things-considered
reaction to certain processes and products, and that heuristic operates as a
mental shortcut for a more careful evaluation.

67
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To test this hypothesis, Slovic offers several studies. One of the most
interesting is designed to provide new information about the risk associated
with some item, and then to see if the information altered people’s judgments
about the benefit associated with it—and also to provide new information about
the benefit of some item, and to test whether that information would alter
people’s judgments about the accompany risk (pp. 421–26). The motivation for
this study is simple. If people’s judgments were purely cognitive, information
about the great benefits of (say) food preservatives should not produce a
judgment than the risks are low—just as information about the great risks of (say)
natural gas should not make people think that the benefits are low.
Strikingly, Slovic finds that information about benefits alters judgments
about risks, and that information about risks alters judgments about benefits (pp.
423–25). When people learn about the low risks of an item, they are moved to
think that the benefits are high—and when they learn about the high benefits of
an item, they are moved to think that the risks are low. Slovic concludes that
people assess products and activities through affect, and that information that
improves people’s affective response will improve their judgments of all
dimensions of those products and activities. Slovic acknowledges that work on
emotion and risk remains in a preliminary state, but he proposes the affect
heuristic as a useful place to start.
Slovic concludes that people assess products and activities through
“affect,” and that information that improves people’s affective response will
improve their judgments of all dimensions of those products and activities. The
central idea is to be that when presented with a risk, people have a general
emotional attitude to it—hence an “affect”—and that this general attitude
operates as a heuristic, much affecting people’s judgments about both benefits
and dangers.
B. What’s an Emotion?
Slovic’s analysis here is intriguing and important. The basic claim has
considerable truth, for emotions play a large role in reactions to risks, and they
help to explain otherwise anomalous behavior.68 Indeed, the “affect heuristic”
operates in many social domains. To take some issues far afield from Slovic’s
own concerns, consider the sharp split, along political lines, in people’s reactions
to the impeachment of President Clinton and the Supreme Court’s decision in
68
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Bush v. Gore.69 In the abstract, there is no reason to think that Republicans would
believe in a lower standard than Democrats for impeachment of the President; in
the abstract, there is no reason to think that Republicans would be more
sympathetic than Democrats to an equal protection challenge to a manual
recount. In both cases, and for people on both sides, an intense emotional
reaction, or affect, seems to have driven conclusions on technical issues in law. In
fact there is empirical confirmation of this point.70 In the area of risk in particular,
“all things considered” emotions do seem to play a role in explaining people’s
perceptions.
At the same time, Slovic’s analysis seems to me undertheorized, and also
to raise a number of additional issues that require further research. The most
basic problem is the distinction between cognition and emotion, about which
Slovic says too little. The distinction is complex and contested,71 and the bare
idea of “affect” cannot much help in unpacking that distinction. In the domain of
risks (and most other places), any “affect” is based on thinking; it is hardly
cognition-free. When a negative emotion is associated with a certain risk—
nuclear power, for example—cognition is playing a central role. In fact there are
large debates about whether an emotion is a form of thought, or whether
thoughts are necessary and sufficient conditions for emotions, and whether
emotions is a sense precede or outrun cognition.72 But it is clear that no simple
line can be drawn between emotions and cognition in most social domains.
Whatever they are, emotions can lead us astray; but the same is true for math,
biology, and animal experiments. I am not entirely sure what Slovic understands
an “emotion” to be, or how he thinks that emotions and cognition relate to one
another.
There are several ways to make progress here. Some scientific work
suggests that the brain has special sectors for emotions, and that some types of
emotions, including some fear-type reactions, can be triggered before the more
cognitive sectors become involved at all.73 It is not clear, however, that fear in
human beings is pre-cognitive or noncognitive, and even if it is in some cases,
that kind of fear would be triggered by few of the risks involved in actual human
lives. Perhaps more to the point, existing experiments, not mentioned by Slovic,
121 S. Ct. (2000).
See Drew Weston.
71 For varying views, see Ronald deSousa, The Rationality of Emotion (1993); Jon Elster,
Alchemies of the Mind (1999); Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (2001).
72 See id.
73 See Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain (1996).
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suggest that when it comes to risk, a key question is whether people can imagine
or visualize the “worst case” outcome—and that surprisingly little role is played
by the stated probability that that outcome will occur.74 In other words, people’s
reactions to risks are often based mostly on the badness of the outcome, and the
vividness of that outcome, rather than the probability of its occurrence. Consider
these points:
—If people are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance for
losses resulting from “terrorism,” they will pay more than if they are asked how
much they will pay for flight insurance from all causes.75
—When people discuss a low-probability risk, their concern rises even if
the discussion consists mostly of apparently trustworthy assurances that the
likelihood of harm really is infinitesimal.76
—People show ”alarmist bias.” When presented with competing accounts
of danger, they tend to move toward the more alarming account.77
A possible conclusion is that with respect to risks, vivid images and
concrete pictures of disaster can “crowd out” other kinds of thoughts, including
the crucial thought that the probability of disaster is really small. With respect to hope,
those who operate gambling casinos and state lotteries play on the emotions in
the particular sense that they conjure up palpable pictures of victory and easy
living. With respect to risks, insurance companies and environmental groups do
exactly the same. With respect to products of all kinds, advertisers try to produce
a good affect to steer consumers into a certain direction, often through the use of
appealing celebrities, through cheerful scenes, or through the creation of an
association between the product and the consumer’s preferred self-image.
An important lesson follows: If government is seeking a method to ensure
that people will take a more rational approach to risk, it might well attempt to
appeal to their emotions. With respect to a cigarette smoking, abuse of alcohol,
reckless driving, and abuse of drugs, this is exactly what government
occasionally attempts to do. It should be no surprise that some of the most
effective efforts to control cigarette smoking appeal to people’s emotions, by
See Loewenstein, supra note; Yuval Rottenstreich and Christopher Hsee, Money, Kisses, and
Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Probability Weighting (Working paper,
University of Chicago, 1999).
75 See Loewenstein, supra note.
76 See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note.
77 W. Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions With Divergent Risk Information, 107 Ec. Journal 1657,
1657-59 (1997)
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making them feel that if they smoke, they will be dupes of the tobacco companies
or imposing harms on innocent third parties.78
IV. Demography, Paternalism, and Trust
I now turn to three issues on which Slovic offers a number of intriguing
findings. These involve demographic differences, paternalism, and the crucial
issue of trust.
A. Demography
Do members of different social groups disagree about risks? Slovic has
many interesting findings. The most general is what he calls “the white male
effect” (p. 399). Apparently white men are less concerned about risks than are
members of any other group. With respect to nearly every risk, white women,
black women, and black men are far more troubled than are white men (pp. 397–
99). But this is the punchline of the story, and it will be helpful to provide a few
details.
Slovic has asked large numbers of people to rank large numbers of risk;
the ranking occurs by saying whether the hazard poses little or no risk; a slight
risk; a moderate risk; or a high risk. Women rank nearly every risk as higher than
men do (pp. 396–402). The same difference is observed for British toxicologists as
well as for ordinary Americans; women toxicologists in Britain rank risks as
more serious than do male toxicologists in Britain (p. 397). The differences are
especially large with respect to nuclear waste, nuclear power, outdoor air
pollution, alcoholic beverages, and suntanning (p. 397). There are other
demographic differences too: As education and income increase, fear of almost
all risks decreases (p. 399).
Once the data are disaggregated, however, a more interesting and
somewhat different picture emerges. It is too simple to draw a distinction
between men and women. Race is important too (p. 400). Across a large number
of hazards, white men perceive risks as consistently lower than do white
females, non-white males, and non-white females (pp. 398–400). In fact there are
no large-scale differences among the latter three groups. White men are the real
outliers. Slovic shows that the results are still more interesting. What drives the
“white male effect” is that not the general view of white males, but the view of
78
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about 30% of them, who believe almost all risks to be very low (pp. 398–99). The
other 70% of white males are not greatly different from the other subgroups.
What can be said about the key 30%? They tend to have more education
and more household income, and also to be more conservative (pp. 399–400).
They also tend, more than most, to disagree with the view that technological
development is destroying nature, to reject the idea that they have very little
control over risks to their health, and to think that future generations can take
care of themselves when facing risks imposed as a result of today’s technologies.
Slovic thinks that “affect” is part of what is responsible for this distribution of
beliefs about risks (pp. 403–9).
All this is extremely interesting. There is, however, a serious gap in
Slovic’s studies. We know that white men are less concerned about certain risks
than members of other demographic groups. But we do not know whether white
men believe that the risks are lower, in terms of statistical risk of harm, than do
members of other demographic groups. White men might believe that the risks
of pesticides deserve a “2” on a seven-point scale, whereas others believe that
those risks deserve a “5,” but all groups might have the same basic sense of the
statistical risks. Does a lifetime risk of 1 in 1 million count as a “1” or a “5”? How
can we tell?
On the data that Slovic presents here,79 it is possible that white men have a
more accurate understanding of the numbers; it is possible that demographic
groups do not much differ in their judgments of the numbers, but that white
men, or the key 30%, are simply less worried than are other people. If they are
less worried, it might be because they have a better sense of the facts. Or it might
be because people who are well-educated, and wealthy, have a sense of relative
security, so that they believe that most of the risks of life are relatively low.
Women and African-Americans, by contrast, have a sense of relative insecurity,
and so think of most risks are higher. Two of Slovic’s other concerns are relevant
here. If people are most concerned about risks that they consider involuntarily
incurred, beyond their control, and unfairly distributed, it should be
unsurprising that for most risks, white men are especially concern-free. And trust
is relevant to people’s assessment of the severity of risks; it might well be that
white men have comparatively greater trust in private and public institutions,
and hence rank risks as relatively low. I now turn to this point.
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B. Trust
Slovic also provides an illuminating discussion of the topic of trust, a
greatly neglected issue in legal treatments of risk regulation (p. 316 et seq.). A
basic puzzle here is the fact that in the last twenty years, our society has grown
healthier and safer, in part because it has spent billions of dollars on risk
reduction; but at the same time, the American public has become more, not less,
concerned about risks (p. 317). Slovic emphasizes that a lack of trust has played
an important role on controversies over managing hazardous technologies. He
also shows that when people are concerned about a hazard, it is often because
they do not trust those who manage it. Consider, for example, the fact that
people tend to view medical technologies involving radiation and chemicals
(such as X-rays) as high-benefit, low-risk, whereas they view industrial
technologies involving radiation and chemicals (such as nuclear power and
pesticides) as high-risk, low-benefit (id.). Far more important than technical risk
assessments is the level of trust in those who try to manage risks and to give
assurance.
Slovic also stresses the fragility of trust. A distinctive feature of trust is
that it is far easier to destroy it than to create it. Thus Slovic offers a study of
forty-five hypothetical news events involving nuclear power; some of these
events were designed to increase trust, whereas others were designed to decrease
it (pp. 321–23). Negative events were judged to have a much more significant
effect than positive events. For example, a nuclear power plant accident in
another state was seen by many to have a powerful effect on trust, whereas
careful selection and training of employees, and an absence of any safety
problems in the past year, had little effect in increasing trust (id.). He also finds
that sources of bad, trust-destroying news are seen as more credible than are
sources of good, trust-creating news (pp. 322–23) This finding is in line with a
related one, mentioned above: When people are unconcerned about a risk,
discussion that is designed to provide still more assurance tends to increase
anxiety, rather than to diminish it.
With respect to trust, Slovic therefore establishes the existence of an
“asymmetry principle” (p. 320): Events that might weaken trust have a
significant effect, whereas events that strengthen trust do very little. Does this
mean that people are confused or irrational? Slovic doesn’t think so. “Conflicts
and controversies surrounding risk management are not due to public
irrationality or ignorance but, instead, can be seen as expected side effects of
these psychological tendencies, interacting with our remarkable form of
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participatory democratic government, and amplified by powerful technological
and social changes in out society” (p. 323). Many of these changes involve the
news media, which can publicize risk-related events from anywhere in the world
instantaneously. And the news media, no less than ordinary people, give special
emphasis to bad, trust-destroying events. “The young science of risk assessment
is too fragile, too indirect, to prevail in such a hostile atmosphere” (p. 324).
What can be done? Slovic favors an increase in public participation in
decision-making, going well beyond public relations to include much more in the
way of actual power-sharing (p. 325). His fear is that governmental efforts to
reassure people are unlikely, without broad participation, to breed anything but
further distrust.80 On this count Slovic might be right, but his own data raise
questions about the value of public participation in increasing distrust. If bad
news is more salient than good news, and if people are intuitive toxicologists,
there is a risk than high levels of public participation in highly technical domains
will simplify increase public fear, with unfortunate consequences for policy.
I am not sure of the solution to this dilemma. Slovic is right to emphasize
the importance of trust, and also to connect that issue to the split between experts
and ordinary people. But efforts to increase public participation in the regulatory
process raises many complexities, and if people come to that process with the
intuitions that Slovic catalogues, then it is not clear that broad public
involvement will be helpful for either sound regulation or trust itself.
C. Paternalism—and Smokers
Do smokers know the risks associated with smoking? In an important
study, W. Kip Viscusi has argued that they do.81 Viscusi asked both smokers and
nonsmokers to say how many smokers are likely to die from various causes as a
result of smoking. Viscusi’s basic finding is that people do indeed know the
risks, and in fact they overestimate them.
With respect to adolescents, at least, Slovic is quite critical of Viscusi’s
findings. He urges that people tend to be overoptimistic, thinking that they
themselves are peculiarly immune from risks that others face (p. 366). Hence
Slovic believes that people’s ability to generate accurate statistical figures is
consistent with the claim that smokers typically underestimate the risk that they
80
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themselves face. Slovic also contends that people’s quantitative judgments
depend on the way that questions are asked, and hence that slight alterations in
questions could generate far more inaccurate numbers (pp. 367–68). He objects as
well that people who know the statistical risk do not have a sufficient sense of
what it is actually like to experience the adverse effects of smoking. He claims,
finally, that people are not likely to understand either the cumulative nature of
the risk or its addictive quality (p. 367). Thus many smokers have no clear sense
of the short-term risks of smoking, and high-school seniors greatly overestimate
the likelihood that they will not be smoking five years after starting to smoke (p.
369). Fewer than half of those who predicted that they would quite smoking
after five years turned out, in fact, to quit. “Many young smokers perceive
themselves to be at little or no risk from smoking because they expect to stop
smoking before any damage to their health occurs. In reality, a high percentage
of young smokers continue to smoke over a long period of time and are placed at
risk by this behavior.” (p. 369).
Slovic’s discussion of these points is brief but highly suggestive. There is a
great deal to sort out here, on the vexing questions associated with ensuring
adequate information, and with the proper place of paternalism, in the domain of
risk-taking. With respect to smoking, people have been saturated with evidence
about the adverse health effects. Viscusi’s claims should not be shocking in this
light. But neither Viscusi nor Slovic offers a great deal of evidence about a key
question: the statistical risk that each smoker believes he or she is running—as
opposed to the statistical risk that smokers believe that smokers generally are
running. If it is true that people generally suffer from excessive optimism with
respect to the risks that they personally are facing, there is a problem of
inadequate information even when people are well aware of the statistical risks.
At the very least, this problem justifies a governmental effort to provide a
corrective. (Consider the advertising campaign: “Drive defensively; watch out
for the other guy.”) And this point raises the expert/lay person split from another
angle. In some areas, the source of the split may be an emphasis on statistical
realities on the part of experts—and an overinflated sense of personal
invulnerability on the part of risk-takers.
IV. Risk Regulation, Psychologically Informed
Slovic is a psychologist, not a policy analyst. While he gestures in the
direction of legal reform, this is not his principal topic. Nonetheless, his work
carries enormous importance for those concerned with policy and law. This is so
partly because an understanding of human cognition (not excluding emotion)
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helps to explain people’s reactions to risks, and their demand for legal responses.
It is so partly because such an understanding can help us see which approaches
to risk regulation will work, and which will not. And it is so partly because of the
continuing battle between technocratic and populist approaches to risk. If we
know why people think what they do, and whether their views are based on
mistakes or instead reasonable judgments of value, we will be able to make some
progress in understanding the role of science, and experts, in the world of risk
regulation.
It is useful here to distinguish among three different enterprises: positive,
prescriptive, and normative.82 Positive work is concerned with making
predictions. When will law take certain forms? What will be the effect of a
particular step on human behavior? Prescriptive work is concerned with
identifying the means of achieving shared goals. If government seeks to increase
people’s fear of certain risks, and to dampen their fear of others, it needs to know
which strategies will work. Normative work is concerned to show what
government’s ends should be. If people make systematic mistakes about the risks
that they face, perhaps government should feel more free to override their views.
Slovic’s emphasis on conflicts between experts and ordinary people casts
considerable light on all of these enterprises. If the availability heuristic helps to
drive certain judgments about risks, we will be able to make predictions about
the likely effects of salient events, both on people’s judgments about when to
insure and to take precautions, and on the demand for legal responses.83 In the
aftermath of a highly publicized incident, considerable movement should be
expected; if illustrations of harm do not come to mind, people might persist in
failing to take care of themselves. If emotions play a large role in risk-related
behavior, educational campaigns are far more likely to work if they involve
memorable images, rather than statistical probabilities. If government wants to
encourage people to protect themselves, it should use particular examples and
try to make them as vivid as possible. And if people make a large number of
mistakes about risks—partly because of emotions, partly because of cognition—
there are reasons to be skeptical of populist conceptions of regulatory
government, and also about the kind of reflexive antipaternalism of much work
on risk regulation. We might, in short, see Slovic’s findings as supportive of the
conception of administration associated with the New Deal, which placed a high
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premium on ensuring regulatory choices by people immersed in the subject at
hand.84
In this light, Slovic’s findings can be brought in close contact with Justice
Stephen Breyer’s discussion of risk regulation,85 probably the most influential
treatment among students of law. Breyer urges, quite plausibly, that the
regulatory state suffers from poor priority-setting. In his view, government is
devoting a lot of resources to small problems, and spending too little time and
effort on large problems.86 Breyer urges the creation of a new body of risk
specialists, with expertise in many fields.87 The task of the specialists would be to
reallocate resources from small problems to large ones.
Breyer offers an impressive analysis of the problem of poor prioritysetting, and he provides a promising institutional correction. In many ways
Breyer calls for a kind of newer New Deal—a system of administration run in
substantial part by technocrats, subject of course to democratic override. But his
book says almost nothing about how people think about risks.88 With reference
to Slovic’s findings, Breyer’s analysis might well be criticized on the ground that
ordinary people would distrust any body of risk specialists, on the ground that
they were unlikely to be sufficiently responsive to their concerns. Perhaps more
interestingly, Breyer’s approach might be criticized on the ground that the sheer
numbers cannot tell us whether a problem is “large” or “small.” People are
reasonably concerned about a range of other variables. This is a large thrust of
Slovic’s work.
In the end, however, Slovic’s findings seem to me mostly supportive of
Breyer’s analysis; indeed Slovic provides strong cognitive ammunition for
Breyer’s diagnosis and even his remedy. Slovic shows that ordinary people make
many mistakes in thinking about the risks associated with various activities. He
also shows that much of the time, people treat safety as a kind of “all or nothing”
matter, are vulnerable to the “zero risk mentality,” overreact to small signals of
dangers, and in some domains show excessive optimism. In these circumstances,
a sensible system of risk regulation will not respond mechanically to what people
think; it will impose large filters on the public’s own conception of appropriate
priority-setting.
See James Landis, The Administrative Process (1925).
Breyer, supra note.
86 Id at 10-29.
87 Id. at 59-68.
88 Breyer does offer a brief treatment of cognitive factors. See id. at 16.
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But there are two grounds for objecting to a purely technocratic approach
to risk regulation. The first emerges from analysis of some of the qualitative
factors that Slovic highlights. Some deaths are particularly bad, and these
deserve unusual attention. When it is especially easy to avoid certain risks,
government should not spend a great deal of time and effort in response. It
would indeed to obtuse to treat all risks as if they were the same, regardless of
context and quality. But it remains true that a sensible society is greatly
concerned to ensure that people have longer and healthier lives, and that if
policies lead government to spend a lot on small problems, and little on large
problems, something is amiss. Note in this regard that a more sensible allocation
of resources could save tens of thousands of lives, tens of billions of dollars, or
both.89
The second criticism of a purely technocratic approach involves people’s
likely reaction to it. To work well, a regulatory system needs public support and
confidence, even if we do not believe that a lack of confidence would be fully
rational. To the extent that government relies on statistical evidence alone, it is
unlikely to promote its own goals. Partly this is because people will assess that
evidence in light of their own motivations and their limited cognitive capacities.
Regulators who are alert to the importance of both confidence and trust will do
what they can to provide information in a way that is well-tailored to how
people think about risk—and that tries to educate people when their usual ways
of thinking lead them astray. In some circumstances, an understanding of how
people think will lead government toward approaches that technocrats,
insensitive to Slovic’s findings, will not have on their viewscreen. We might say
that good technocrats need to know not only economics and science, but
psychology as well.
But the most important lesson of this book seems to me to lie elsewhere.
Because of predictable features of human cognition, people’s intuitions are
unreliable,90 and they are prone to blunder about the facts. As we have seen,
these blunders have harmful consequences for regulatory policy. To be effective,
regulators must be aware of perceived risk, not only actual risk. But for purposes
of policy, what is most important, most of the time, is actual risk rather than
perceived risk. The task for the future is to respond to people’s values, not to
their errors.
See Tammy Tengs and John Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments
in Life-Saving, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved 167, 172-74 176 (Robert Hahn ed. 1996).
90 See the discussion of System 1 and System 2 in Kahneman and Frederick, supra note.
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